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Forced to cede their vast domains east of the Mississippi River, the
Five Civilized Tribes were ordered to settle in perhaps the least
desirable part of the Louisiana Purchase. Because of their power and
sophistication, the five tribes received what no other tribe would re-
ceive again from the government-a grant in fee simple.' As settlers
occupied the remaining parts of the national territory, the five tribes
were again forced to cede part of their holdings to allow settlement
of the Indians displaced by expansion. The Civil War brought the
final cession; the five tribes were punished for siding with the South.2
Considered together in 1837, the five tribes had title to what is now
the entire state of Oklahoma, excepting the Panhandle. In 1866, this
had been cut back to roughly the eastern half of Oklahoma. Still
unsatisfied with the tribes' progress in achieving "civilization," the
federal government decided to break up the tribal ownership into
allotments in severalty to each tribal member. This was accomplished
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.3 For the most
part, the land that was not allotted to individual tribal members was
sold; a few small parcels were left as tribal land.
The other Indians of the state were settled on reservations, created
by the cession of land by the five tribes. With the single exception of
the Osages, the federal government was ceded land by the five tribes,
and it in turn gave reservations to the "wild tribes." The Osages were
given a direct equitable grant in 18724 by the Cherokees because it
was originally Osage land on which the Cherokees settled.
The status of property rights of Indians on reservations is some-
thing more than the "aboriginal Indian title of use and occupancy,"
but something less than a fee simple. These Indians were also given
allotments, either under the General Allotment Act" or the special
acts for the Sac and Fox," the Miamis, and the Peorias.7 Most of the
surplus reservation land which was not allotted was sold; however,
land neither sold nor allotted was held "in trust" by the federal
government for these tribes. Land held in trust is of the identical
quantum of interest as reservation land.8
It is against this background that Indian claims to the beds of
watercourses in Oklahoma must be analyzed. The five tribes have
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fee simple claims; the general allotment Indians (including the Sac
and Fox, Miamis, and Peorias) have "Indian reservation" claims.
The Arkansas River Cases
As a general rule, upon a territory's admission to statehood, the
state acquires portions of the public lands. Included in the public
lands are navigable rivers, subject to the navigation servitude of the
federal government. As a general rule, the beds of nonnavigable
watercourses are owned by the adjoining riparian owners to the
middle of the watercourse. Exceptions do occur which render these
general rules nugatory; as with so many other areas of the law, Indians
tend to be the exception.
The landmark case is Brewer-Elliott Oil 6 Gas Co. v. United
States." The state of Oklahoma had executed oil and gas leases on
part of the Arkansas River bed above its junction with Grand River,
opposite Osage County. The federal government, as trustee for the
Osages, sued for an injunction against further exploration and drill-
ing and to quiet title, grounding the claim of the Osages on the fact
that, as owner of the entire mineral estate in the upland (which is the
Osage Reservation), the Osages owned the mineral estate to the
middle of the Arkansas. The state intervened as a defendant, alleging
it owned the river bed in fee. The District Court for Western
Oklahoma held that the Arkansas River was nonnavigable above its
confluence with Grand River, that the Osages took title to the river
bed from the Cherokees in 187z, and that the Osages were entitled
to the relief prayed for. The Eighth Circuit held that ". . . whether
the river was navigable or nonnavigable, the United States, as the
owner of the territory through which the Arkansas flowed before
statehood, had the right to dispose of the river bed, and had done so,
to the Osages."'10 On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
courts, although it reserved the question of whether Indian tribes
could ever receive title to a navigable river bed by simply holding that
the Arkansas River at this locus in quo was nonnavigable.
Almost half a century later, the Supreme Court was forced to
decide the question reserved in Brewer-Elliott, in the case of Choctaw
Nation v. Oklahoma.:" Again the state of Oklahoma was leasing the
Arkansas River for oil and gas; but this time it was below its conflu-
ence with Grand River. At this point, the Arkansas serves as the
boundary line between the old Cherokee and Choctaw nations. The
Cherokees sued in United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma to recover royalties from the leases and to
prevent interference with its property rights. The Choctaws and
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Chickasaws intervened as plaintiffs, claiming they also had property
rights in the river bed. The district court entered judgment on the
pleadings against plaintiffs, ruling that as a matter of law, the Indian
tribes could have no legitimate claim to the bed of a navigable river
and that title remained in the United States until Oklahoma's ad-
mission as a state, at which time it passed to Oklahoma. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed.12 The tribes then petitioned for a writ of certiorari
to the Supreme Court, which was granted. 13
The Court first examined the Indians' claims, noting that not only
title to the minerals was involved, but also the ownership of dry land
created by the narrowing and deepening of the channel by the
Arkansas River Navigation Project. The Indians' case rested on the
Treaties of Dancing Rabbit Creek (Choctaws, 1830) ,'- New Echota
(Cherokees, 1835),1 5 and Doaksville (Chickasaws, 1837),16 which
employed the words "up" or "down" the Arkansas. To the state's
contention that a skilled draftsman would have employed more
conclusive language if the United States had really intended to con-
vey the title to the river bed of a navigable watercourse, the Court
responded with six reasons to the contrary. First, there is a rule of
construction that all doubts or ambiguities in Indian treaties should
be resolved in favor of the Indians.
These treaties are not to be considered as exercises in ordinary
conveyancing. The Indian Nations did not seek out the United
States and agree upon an exchange of lands in an arms-length trans-
action. Rather treaties were imposed upon them and they had no
choice but to consent. As a consequence, this Court has often held
that treaties with the Indians must be interpreted as they would
have understood them.... and any doubtful expressions in them
should be resolved in the Indians' favor .... Indeed the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek itself provides that "in the construction of
this Treaty, wherever well-founded doubt shall arise, it shall be
construed most favorably toward the Choctaws."' 7
Second, there was a contemporaneous construction of the treaty
language by President Tyler in the patent to the Cherokees in 1842:
... thence down the main channel of Arkansas River."-"'
Third, "Congress was accustomed to using the terms 'up' and
'down' the river when designating a navigable river as the boundary
between States, ... and when it did so, the boundary was set as the
middle of the main channel."'-9 Since the Indian nations were con-
sidered sovereign entities, the Congress must have intended the
words to have as much effect as if setting a boundary between the
states.
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Fourth, "the United States was competent to say the 'north side'
or 'bank' of the Arkansas River when that was what it meant, as it
had in the 1817 grant to the Cherokees in the Arkansas Territory."'2
Congress knew how to avoid a transfer of rights to a river bed, and if
it had so intended, it would have used appropriate language.
Fifth, if the United States had been intent on insuring that the
Indians would have no legitimate claims to the river bed, it could
have made an "express exclusion of the bed of the Arkansas River
by the United States as there was to other land within the grants." 2'
In fact, there seems little reason to believe such an exclusion was
desired by either party.
As a practical matter, reservation of the river bed would have
meant that petitioners were not entitled to enter upon and take
sand and gravel or other minerals from the shallow parts of the
river or islands formed when the water was low .... We do not
believe that petitioners would have considered that they could
have been precluded from exercising these basic ownership rights
to the river bed, and we think it very unlikely that the United
States intended otherwise. Nor do we believe that the United
States would intend that it rather than petitioners have title to
the dry bed left from avulsive changes of the river's course, which
as the District Court noted are common in this area. Indeed, the
United States seems to have had no present interest in retaining
title to the river bed at all; it had all it was concerned with in
its navigational easement via the constitutional power over
commerce.
22
Sixth, there is no legitimate basis to the state's argument that the
United States retained title in order to convey it to a future state,
because each grant to the five tribes is accompanied by a promise that
"no part of the land granted to them shall ever be embraced in any
Territory or State. 23
Choctaw Nation, then, established the fact that an Indian tribe
could have an interest in a navigable river bed. And Brewer-Elliott
established the fact that an Indian tribe could have an interest in a
nonnavigable river bed where it owned the mineral estate of the
upland. But what if a river is nonnavigable and the Indian tribe does
not own the mineral estate to the upland? Choctaw and Chickasaw
Nations v. Seay24 involved the Red River, where no Indian tribes have
reserved the mineral estate to the upland. The Choctaws and Chick-
asaws contended that because an act of Congress25 authorized the
Secretary of Interior to lease for oil and gas the remaining unallotted
lands of each tribe, including "lands lying south of the medial line
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of Red River to the south bank thereof," the tribes must necessarily
have had an interest in the Red River. The Court held that once
allotment occurred, no interest remained in the tribe; accordingly,
once allotment was made of riparian land, the allottee owned the
river bed (to the south bank, in the case of the Red; to the middle of
the stream in most cases). The Court went on to say that if any
tracts were unallotted on the Red River, of course the tribe would
own the river bed to the south bank.
Application of Brewer-Elliott, Choctaw Nation, and Seay
Once it is established that the five tribes hold fee simple title to all
lands which have not been allotted to individual members of each
tribe or which have not been sold to individuals, it follows that all
river beds of nonnavigable watercourses within the territory originally
comprising the Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw, Creek, and Semi-
nole nations at the time of allotment, are owned by the particular
tribe. As to navigable watercourses, the five tribes will probably be
held to own their river beds as well, unless an express exclusion is
made or unless the words of the treaty under which the tribe took the
territory involved employ the phrase "along the bank" or "along the
(north) (south) (east) (west) side of said river."
A more difficult problem is posed in regard to watercourses which
constitute boundaries between tribes. While this remains an un-
settled issue, a great deal has been clarified by a recent pronounce-
ment from the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Oklahoma. Public Law 93-195, enacted by Congress on December
20, 1973, created jurisdiction in the Eastern District to hear the
boundary dispute between the Cherokees and Choctaw-Chickasaws
(the unresolved question of Choctaw Nation). A footnote in Choc-
taw Nation indicated that the Supreme Court would have preferred
the boundary dispute to be resolved by dividing the Arkansas River
in half.26 The Supreme Court suggested that the words "up" or
"down" a river had a definite meaning when Congress set boundaries
between states-each state owned to the center-and there is no
good reason not to apply that rule when determining the boundary
between another type of sovereignty, two Indian nations. The three-
judge panel which heard the boundary dispute was not unimpressed
by this footnote.
It seems to us from a careful reading of Choctaw v. Oklahoma,
that the Supreme Court by strong implications expressed its views
as to title of the Arkansas River bed, and what is said is not mere
suggestion, but amounts to a complete understanding that the
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tribes, the Choctaws and Chickasaws on one hand and the Chero-
kees on the other, acquired the river bed in fee by reason of the
large tracts of land granted them for their permanent home, free
of white man's interference and without government reservation
of navigable rivers.
The district court divided the Arkansas River down the middle as
a boundary between the two tribes, finding nothing in the Treaty of
Dancing Rabbit Creek (1830) with the Choctaws to suggest an
intent by the United States to transfer more than the south half of
the Arkansas River. This is so because the territory description begins
"near Fort Smith, where the Arkansas boundary crossed the Arkansas
River, running thence to the source of the Canadian fork. ...
Fort Smith is on the south side of the Arkansas River. Article i of the
Treaty of 1830 with the Choctaws provided that all treaties made
with the Choctaws prior to the Treaty of 183029 were revoked to the
extent inconsistent. The main argument by the Choctaw-Chickasaws
was that the Treaty of Doak's Stand (18zo)3 with the Choctaws
began at Point Remove, which is on the north side of the Arkansas
River. However, the district court chose to rely on the revocation
clause in Article 1 of the 183o Treaty. Since Choctaw Nation decided
that the Indians owned the entire river bed and since the district
court ruled the Treaty of 1830 meant the Choctaws only owned the
south half, by necessity the Cherokees owned the north half.
With these four river bed cases (Brewer-Elliott, Choctaw Nation,
Seay, and Choctaw Nation v. Cherokee Nation) as a backdrop,
several rules were suggested to resolve the claims of Indians in
watercourses.
The general allotment Indians do not hold their tribal lands in
fee as do the five tribes; instead, such tribal lands are of a different
character. 31
In dealing with the status of ceded lands, the basic question that
constantly recurs is whether a cession of lands by an Indian tribe
has finally and completely ended the interest of the tribe therein,
or whether the tribe retains some equitable interest in the land
conveyed. Prior to i88o, most of the treaties, agreements, and
statutes by which Indian tribes ceded land to the United States
provided for an outright and final conveyance, in return for which
the Indians received cash payments, annuities, substitute lands, or
other things of value.
For about four decades after the adoption of the General Allot-
ment Act an alternative pattern prevails. "Surplus" reservation
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lands not needed for allotment, are turned over to the government
for the purpose of sale. The Indians are credited with the proceeds
only as the land is sold, and the United States is not itself bound
to purchase any part of the land so opened for disposal. Undisposed
of lands of this class remain tribal property until disposed of as
provided by law. 2
The author just quoted goes on to indicate that land having the status
of "tribal property" gives the reservation Indians the possessory rights
to the subsurface, absent an express exclusion from the document
creating the particular Indian reservation.83
Therefore, the same rules of construction that apply to the five
tribes should apply to the general allotment Indians. Their claims
to river beds crossing or adjoining the particular reservation are
superior in all respects; of course, the claim is not one of fee, but
rather as the holder of an equitable interest on the federal public
domain.
A final note of caution: tribal lands of which disposition has been
made, either to a tribal or nontribal member in fee, acquire the same
status as riparian land anywhere else, i.e., absent an express exclusion,
the riparian owner owns to the middle of a nonnavigable watercourse
and none of a navigable watercourse.
Conclusion
In determining the claims of the Indians of Oklahoma to the river
beds, the following considerations should be made. First, treaties
with the Indians are to be construed in their favor. Second, the fact
that a particular watercourse is labeled "navigable" is not controlling
so long as the Indians involved received their rights in the property
prior to Oklahoma's admission as a state. Third, the language of the
treaty placing the Indians on the particular tract controls. Fourth,
the phrases, "up," "down," and "main channel" have specific mean-
ings only in the context of treaty language of the bordering tribe.
Fifth, "to and along the bank" dearly implies an intent that the tribe
concerned receive no rights in the river bed. Sixth, the ownership in
fee of land bordering a watercourse is not a requisite of a legitimate
claim to the river bed. Finally, mineral ownership to the upland
carries with it the mineral rights in the river bed.
NOTES
1. Act of Dec. 29 , 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (Cherokees); Act of Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 417
(Creeks); Act of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Choctaws); Act of Jan. 17, 1837, 31
Stat. 573 (Chickasaws); Act of May 9, 1832, 7 Stat. 423 (Seminoles).
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z. Act of Mar. 21, 1866, 14 Stat. 755 (Seminoles); Act of Apr. 28, 1866, 14 Stat.
769 (Choctaws & Chickasaws); Act of June 14, 1866, 14 Stat. 785 (Creeks); Act of
July 19, 1866, 14 Stat. 799 (Cherokees).
3. Act of July 1,1902, 32 Stat. 716 (Cherokees); Act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495,
505-13 Choctaws & Chickasaws); Act of Mar. 1, 1901, 31 Stat. 861 (Creeks); Act of
July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 567, 568 (Seminoles).
4. Act of June 5, 1872, 17 Stat. 228.
5. Act of Feb. 8, 1887, 24 Stat. 388.
6. Act of Feb. 13, 1891, 26 Stat. 749.
7. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, 25 Stat. 1013.
8. F. COHEN, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 334 (Albuquerque, 1971) [hereinafter cited
as FEDERAL INDIAN LAwv].
9. 26o U.S. 77 (1922).
1o. Id. at 8o.
11. 397 U.S. 6zo (1970).
12. 402 F.2d 739 (1968).
13- 394 U.S. 972 (1969).
14. Act of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333.
25. Act of Dec. 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478.
16. Act of Jan. 17, 1837, 11 Stat. 573.
17. 397 U.S. 6zo, 630-31 (1970).
28. Id. at 633.
19. Id. at 631 n.8.
20. Id. at 631. The grant in 1817 is 7 Stat. 158.
21. Id. at 634.
22. Id. at 634-35.
23. Id. at 635.
24- 235 F.2d 30 (ioth Cir. 1956), cert denied, 352 U.S. 917 (1956).
25. Act of May 26, 1930, 46 Stat. 385.
26. 397 U.S. 62o, 631 n.8 (1970).
27. This is from a copy of the original opinion which was most graciously supplied
independently by counsel for both tribes, Earl Boyd Pierce for the Cherokees and Lon
Kile for the Choctaw-Chickasaws. It is found at p. 24 of the original.
28. Act of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Article 2).
29. Act of Sept. 27, 1830, 7 Stat. 333 (Article i).
30. Act of Oct. 18, 1820, 7 Stat. 21o.
31. The final difficulty with the five tribes is the status of claims of the Chickasaws
in Choctaw watercourses, Choctaws in Chickasaw watercourses, Creeks in Seminole
watercourses, and Seminoles in Creek watercourses. Without reading Choctaw Nation,
it would seem that the rights of Chickasaws and Choctaws in tribal land were frozen in
1855, and that the rights of Seminoles and Creeks in tribal land were frozen in 1866.
Yet the Chickasaws intervened as a plaintiff alongside the Choctaws, and no mention
is made in Choctaiv Nation and Choctaiv Nation v. Cherokee Nation of any question
as to the Chickasaws' standing, even though a map of the tribal domains in 3855
shows clearly that no part of the Chickasaw Nation borders the Arkansas River. (J.
Morris & E. McReynolds, Historical Atlas of Oklahoma, map #23 (1965).)
32. FEDERAL INDIAN LAw, supra note 8, at 334 (emphasis added).
33- Id. at 312-13.
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